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Operational Manoeuvre Group
Operation SOHIL LARAM II,
Kandahar Province, February 2008
Sean M. Maloney

I

t is natural for military historians
to focus on purely national issues
and national history. Indeed,
writing about coalition warfare is
notoriously difficult, particularly
when it comes to using sources from
all of the key national players, sources
subject to uneven availability. Then
there is the Canadian proclivity
towards making up for lost time
in military history affairs, which
generates gravitation towards
examining Canadian combat arms
units to the exclusion of the activities
of higher headquarters and support
units. Indeed, we expect our larger
allies, with their more robust history
production apparati, to take care of
themselves and our coalition history.
As a result, a danger exists that we
may overlook critical aspects of our
military history particularly when we
have allied forces under Canadian
command.
In addition to providing a battle
group, a provincial reconstruction
team, special operations forces,
and mentoring teams to the war
in Afghanistan, Canada holds
rotating command of the NATO-led
International Security Assistance
Force’s (ISAF) Regional Command
(South) Headquarters. RC (South)
is responsible for four brigade-sized
national commands or task forces

Abstract: In February 2008 Regional Battle
Group (South) in Afghanistan, based on
The 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha Rifles
supported by Canadian “enablers” and
working with Afghan national security
forces, conducted a mission known as
Operation SOHIL LARAM II in the Maywand
district of Kandahar province. A weak
NATO presence coupled with a corrupt
police force had allowed the Taliban
to turn Maywand into a safe haven.
Following the dismissal of the police force,
Op SOHIL LARAM II was successful in
disrupting Taliban operations, reasserting
government authority and regaining the
confidence of the local population. In
addition, the disruption of Taliban forces
allowed the relief in place of Canadian
battle groups to proceed without the usual
interference.

that conform to the main provinces in
southern Afghanistan: TF Helmand
(British); TF Oruzgan (Dutch); TF
Zabol (Romanian and American) and
TF Kandahar (Canada). In addition,
an Afghan corps headquarters, 205
Corps, is the counterpart to RC
(South) and each province boasts
an Afghan National Army (ANA)
brigade. For the most part, each ANA
brigade is twinned with each ISAF
brigade and will control between
one and four kandaks, or Afghan
battalion-sized forces.
Scarce national resources or
“enablers” like helicopters, close
air support, unmanned aerial
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vehicles (UAVs), various Intelligence
Surveillance and Target Acquisition
(ISTAR) capabilities, Civil-Military
Cooperation (CIMIC) and artillery
operate everywhere in RC (South)
depending on where they are needed,
but usually come under the control of
a provincial brigade headquarters for
the duration of a given operation and
then they revert to national control.
Consequently, few operations in
Afghanistan are conducted by a
single country on its own.
In January 2008, Canada took
command of RC (South) Headquarters.
Led by Major-General Marc Lessard,
RC (South) HQ deployed resources
in Kandahar Province in order to
supplement operations already
underway commanded by BrigadierGeneral Guy Laroche, the commander
of Task Force Kandahar. One of
those resources was an entity called
Regional Battle Group (South) or
RBG(S). The RBG(S) acted as a regional
reserve force and could be employed
by RC (South) HQ anywhere in the
region it deemed necessary. The only
self-imposed caveat was that the force
had to be used to generate enduring
operational-level effects, not only
short-term tactical or provincial-level
effects.
The United Kingdom assigned
the 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha
61
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Rifles as RBG(S) in the fall of 2007
“without strings,” meaning that the
usual restrictive national caveats
were lifted for the duration. This
light infantry battalion, composed
of Nepalese Gurkhas led by British
officers and supplemented with
Canadian “enablers,” proved to be
a formidable and agile asset and
significantly contributed to achieving
ISAF’s aims in Kandahar Province.
This article will examine Operation
SOHIL LARAM II, an operation
conducted by the Regional Battle
Group (South) in Maywand district of
Kandahar province in late February
2008.

The Operational Level
Situation

T

he situation in RC (South) in
early 2008 was calm relative to
previous years. The United Kingdom
had, since 2006, tripled the size of its
forces in Helmand province, from
a battle group to nearly a brigade.
Headway was made in the Musa
Qala area and even some senior
Taliban commanders were starting
to join the PTS amnesty programme.
In Oruzgan province, the Dutch task
force controlled the main population
centres, while an Australian special
operations task force kept the Taliban

off balance elsewhere. Zabol, recently
taken over by a Romanian battle
group, still boasted an American
Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) and for the most part kept the
vital Ring Road South (RRS) open.
In Kandahar province, the
Canadian battlegroup and an Afghan
National Army company kicked the
Taliban out of Arghandab district, less
than five kilometers from Kandahar
City. This last move was the latest
in a campaign to block Taliban
attempts to take control of a district
that abutted Ring Road South and
the city. The enemy had, since 2006,
tried to interdict the four main routes
into Kandahar City. Zharey district
was, in January 2008, garrisoned by
ANA and Afghan National Police
and there was a substantial amount
of development taking place. Over in
Panjwayi district, the Taliban that had
been pushed out of Zharey mounted
an IED (improvised explosive device)
campaign on the main roads there.
Taliban still operated in Zharey,
but unlike back in 2006-07, they
were unable to seriously control the
population. There was virtually no
enemy activity around Kandahar
Air Field (KAF), nor was the enemy
operating along Highway 4, the main
trade route between Afghanistan and
Pakistan in the south.
Task Force Kandahar and the
ANA’s 205 Corps did not have the
forces nor the resources to garrison
the entire province, so they focused
on districts that were vital ground.
Northern districts like Khakriz,
Ghorak and Sha Wali Kot had varying
levels of Taliban influence but for the
most part that influence remained
local.
The 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha Rifles,
acted as the Regional Battlegroup (South)
reserve force in 2007-08. 1 RGR developed
a close working relationship with the
Canadian task force.
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The Taliban maintained training
sites, weapons dumps, and command
nodes inside Pakistan, notably in and
around the city of Quetta, where the
Taliban command for the south, the
Quetta Shura, was located. The modus
operandi was to infiltrate fighters
individually or in small numbers into
Afghanistan, smuggle in weapons
and ammunition separately, mate the
two and then fight. Suicide bombers
had a separate but parallel system. To
mount any sort of operation inside
Kandahar City or in the adjacent
districts took time. A command node
(or nodes depending on the size
of the force) had to be established
first, followed by a logistics node
to stockpile weapons and ammo.
“Rat lines” consisting of safe houses,
sympathizers in the transportation
community, and facilitators of all
types had to be positioned and
activated. Notably, the rat lines
sometimes worked in reverse for
Taliban casualty evacuation.
These shadowy networks were
notoriously difficult to track down,
in part because the police forces
(the exception was the National
Directorate of Security (NDS – Afghan
Secret Police), which was small but
fairly effective) were not capable of
taking a sophisticated approach to
doing so. Checkpoints and police
patrols could be bribed, others could
be intimidated, still others adopted a
“live and let live” policy. ISAF and
OEF forces, however, maintained
steady pressure on the enemy system
to generate as much friction as
possible within it.
The Taliban also tried their hand
at establishing a parallel government,
but this generally took negative
forms as opposed to competitive
forms. Attacking schools and the
health care system in order to deny
effective government services was
not the same as actually providing
parallel services, but there were small
numbers of Taliban “judges” and
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there were “wandering Mullahs”
proselytizing in the rural areas,
all backed up with a sophisticated
intimidation campaign that made
the Taliban look more powerful
then they actually were, especially
in the rural areas. In other districts,
the Taliban co-opted corrupt local
leaders, or other men who played
both sided against the middle for
sheer survival or profit or both. These
people tended to overlap with the
narcotic producers in certain areas
of RC (South).
The situation as it stood in late
January 2008 was that the enemy was
incapable of interdicting the main
highways throughout RC (South) and
failed to interfere with operations at

Kandahar Air Field. The highways
and the airfield are absolutely critical
to the ISAF, OEF and Afghan efforts
in RC (South). Second, the Taliban
had not taken Kandahar City. Control
of Kandahar City is critical to the
control of southern Afghanistan both
geographically and psychologically:
not only is it a transportation hub, it
is also the religious/political centre
of the region. Weakened in all the
adjacent districts, thwarted in their
latest endeavour in Arghandab
district, the Quetta Shura was at a
crossroads.
If the Quetta Shura hoped to
move back to the heady days of
2006 when they seriously contested
coalition control of Zharey and
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Ch-47 Chinooks like this one conducted the night airmobile insertion of 1 RGR into the Band-e
Timor communities in Maywand district during the opening stages of Op SOHIL LARAM II.

Panjwayi districts, mounted an
incessant suicide bomb campaign
in the city and showered Kandahar
Air Field with rockets nearly every
night, the networks, command nodes,
and logistics nodes had to be re-built
nearly everywhere. The cells in place
had to be revitalized, reinforced,
and resupplied. Consequently, the
networks in the districts in the next
ring away from the city had to be
revitalized first as a precondition. As
it stood in early 2008, if the Taliban
were unable to achieve the saliency
they had in 2006, they would lose even
more credibility with the population.
That credibility was eroded daily with
each new government reconstruction
or governance initiative.
The generalities of this situation
were known in RC (South) and in
Task Force Kandahar in early 2008
– the pressure had to be kept up in an
overall sense across the region. The
issue in Kandahar province, however,
64
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was the upcoming relief-in-place
(RIP) of the 3rd Battalion, R22eR
battlegroup with 2nd Battalion,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
Infantry. In the past, the enemy
exploited less than seamless RIPs to
the detriment of the departing and
arriving forces. The arriving force
was usually inexperienced and took
time to get up to speed with the deep
nuances of operating in the districts
and communities. Disruptive activity
by coalition forces could shield the
RIP and buy the incoming forces time
to acclimatize.
At the same time, enemy forces
in the peripheral districts tended to
operate in “seams.” They understood
the problems of coordination between
coalition partners on the artificial
boundary lines established by staffs
and understood that coalition control
lessened the further away from
the main population centres that
they operated. If the Taliban hoped

to revitalize their networks, they
would work out of those seams first,
use them as staging areas, and then
infiltrate and support their forces
in districts adjacent to the city. The
combination of these factors pointed
the planning staffs from RBG(S),
TFK, and RC (South) towards one
particular district – Maywand.
Maywand district lies, from east
to west, between Zharey district
and Helmand province; Ring Road
South runs straight through the
middle of the district, through the
prosperous agricultural community
of Hutel. From north to south,
Maywand is sandwiched between
the mountainous Ghorak district and
the Arghandab river and then the
inhospitable Reg Desert. The Dasht,
as the wide open plain is called, is a
millennia-old trade and transit route
between the Indian subcontinent and
Persia.
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fall, but these were independent and
temporary operations generally not
coupled with Afghan efforts in the
district.
The potential operational-level
effects of inserting the Regional
Battlegroup (South) into Maywand
district were considerable. It would
disrupt the ratline into Zharey and
Panjwayi districts, especially during
the RIP. It would demonstrate to
the Taliban that coalition forces did
not fear operating in districts they
did not traditionally operate in and
that coalition forces would operate
with impunity. Such an operation
would also enhance security along
Ring Road South, the link between
Kandahar Air Field and Task Force
Helmand.
The main problem, as the
planners knew, was that without
an enduring coalition presence the
enemy would eventually re-infiltrate
the district and be back in business.
“Emptying the garbage” as the
Canadians called it, or as the British
named it, “mowing the lawn” had its
uses, however. Disruption without

occupation was not optimal, but
there was no apparent solution to that
problem in the initial stages of the
planning process, so SOHIL LARAM
II started off conceptually as a largescale RBG(S) raid.

Task Organization

R

BG(S) or Task Force TIGER
was based on 1st Battalion, The
Royal Gurkha Rifles (1 RGR). Led by
Lieutenant-Colonel Jonny Bourne,
1 RGR normally had three light
infantry companies. In Afghanistan,
however, 1 RGR detached one
company to Helmand province,
leaving two infantry companies
available for RBG(S) operations:
“A” Company led by Major Paul
“Pitch” Pitchfork, and “C” Company
led by Major Will Kefford. 1 There
was a support company broken
down into two Fire Support Groups
(machine guns, snipers) and a mortar
platoon of six 82 mm mortars. 1 RGR
had its own doctor and medical
team. In terms of mobility, one
company was transported in Vector

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2009

Operationally, Maywand was a
seam between Task Force Helmand
and Task Force Kandahar, right smack
dab in the middle. The district had a
reputation as a singularly large rat
line connecting extensive infiltration
routes in the Helmand river valley
that came in from Pakistan, to the
western edge of Zharey district and
the western-most point of Panjwayi
district. Intelligence analysts assumed
over the years that the southern part
of the district, an elongated series of
communities called Band‑e Timor,
was a Taliban stronghold, out of
reach because of the priorities to
protect the city and far enough
south from the main highway to be
off the beaten path. Word filtered
out the previous year that there was
even a functional Taliban shadow
government complete with judges
operating there.
The district leader and his police
had a reputation for being brutally
corrupt but because he had been
appointed by the current governor,
he appeared untouchable. Rumours
abounded that his police hi-jacked
World Food Program (WFP) aid
trucks with impunity and even
executed their drivers back in the
summer of 2007 because WFP refused
to pay him off. There was no Afghan
National Army presence. Tribally,
Maywand was dominated by Noorzai
and familial connections between
the district and the border city of
Spinboldak reportedly involved
narcotics smuggling. in short, it was
an ideal district to house a Taliban
logistics node and rat line.
There had been two coalition
forays into Maywand back in 2007.
The 2 RCR battlegroup conduced
operations through the eastern
portion of Band-e Timor with a
company group in May, while the
1 RGR’s predecessor RGB(S), the
1st Battalion, Royal Welsh (The
Royal Welsh Fusiliers) essentially
conducted a similar operation in the

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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“A” Company 1 RGR conducts a compound
search on Objective CHELSEA. This action
would stimulate enemy movement and
make their leaders more vulnerable to
other coalition action.

The Plan

P

vehicles, essentially a six-wheeled,
uparmoured Pinzgauer truck, and
WMIK Landrovers armed with .50
cal machine guns and M-19 grenade
launchers. The other company was
carried by a squadron of Viking
tracked oversnow vehicles armed
with 7.62mm general purpose
machine guns and crewed by Royal
Marines. Small portable bridges and
fascines were carried to assist in
moving across water obstacles that
criss-crossed the areas near the river.
1 RGR had also just conducted two
airmobile operations, one in northern
Kandahar province, and the other
into the Chora Valley in Oruzgan
with the Australian SAS Regiment,
and was proficient in those types of
operations as well.
1 RGR had also worked closely
with the Canadian battlegroup on
at least two occasions in Zharey and
Panjwayi districts. In each operation,
a Gurkha company operated under
Canadian battlegroup command.
1 RGR was short on long-range
firepower, however. Though the
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Gurkhas were equipped with a
variety of mortars, LieutenantColonel Bourne requested and
received a two-gun detachment of
M‑777 155 mm guns, two 81 mm
mortars and a troop of TLAV APCs2
led by Lieutenant Candice Dunn
from the newly-arrived “B” Battery,
2 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery.
Since 1 RGR was the regional mobile
reserve, it normally did not have its
own specialist “enablers.” Canadian
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
and Tactical Psychological Operations
Teams (TPT or PSYOPS) teams
were also attached. For intelligence
collection and liaison purposes,
the Afghan National Directorate
of Security attached a number of
officers. A Canadian Joint Terminal
Air Controller (JTAC) from Air
Command and another from the RAF
Regiment (a squadron of which was
protecting Kandahar Air Field) with
their specialist communications gear
also joined the force so 1 RGR could
communicate with close air support
and attack aviation resources.

lanning SOHIL LARAM II was a
essentially a three-way dialogue
between the 1 RGR, TFK, and RBG(S)
staffs. That dialogue established
the justification as to exactly why
the Gurkha battalion would be
employed in Maywand district;
conceptually how the battle group
would be employed, with several
options depending on transportation
availability; and the coordination and
deconfliction aspects. All of this had
to be approved by Major-General
Marc Lessard after his multinational
staff at Regional Command (South)
gave the thumbs up.
Op SOHIL LARAM II was
designed to achieve a number of
effects. The most obvious was the
disruption of enemy activity in
Maywand district, flushing out
and destroying leadership targets
which would result in positive
effects both Helmand and Kandahar
provinces. As for the district itself,
the operation was designed to leave
the local population with a positive
impression of the coalition forces,
ANA and ANP with the hope that
this would serve as a basis for future
operations intended to establish
a permanent Afghan government
presence throughout the district.
Finally, the operation was designed
to improve the police presence
along Highway 1 by reconstructing
ANP checkpoints, many of which
were rudimentary at best, partiallymannned and nearly indefensible.
There were a number of other
reasons to conduct a Maywand
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operation at this particular time.
One particular event on 13 February
2008 was significant. A Sperwer
TUAV (Tactical Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle) observed three World Food
Program trucks being hijacked in
broad daylight just east of Hutel.
The attackers bogged one truck
down attempting to escape while
an RG-31 Nayala and a section from
the Canadian Operational Mentor
and Liaison Team (OMLT) and two
platoons from 2nd Kandak in Howz-e
Madad raced to respond. With a B-1B
in support, and the TUAV tracking
the movements of the hijackers, the
OMLT and the Afghan National
Army determined that police from
Maywand district were responsible.
This latest attack was the final straw
and resulted in the replacement of all
160 police in Maywand district by the
Kandahar provincial Chief of Police,
General Saquib.
The unplanned wholesale
replacement of the Maywand police
during the operational planning
process now provided a window of

opportunity to renew the district.
Rather than just raiding into the
remoter parts of Maywand, the
RBG(S) would be able to generate
synergy by facilitating a combined
coalition forces-police presence
and help the new police establish
themselves which would be a critical
step towards improving governance
in the district. There was an operating
theory that the district chief and
the corrupt police were in cahoots
regarding aid convoy shakedowns,
but no action had been taken against
the district chief for a variety of
reasons. The removal of “his” police
meant that he would lose “muscle”
and therefore be more compliant.
As the planning process progressed,
2nd Kandak was brought into the
operation, initially at company
strength. A second company was
later added. Even though 2nd
Kandak would be committed for
a limited period, the information
operations and governance benefits
that could be derived from highly
visible joint ANA-ANP patrolling

could be substantial, especially on the
Maywand population.
The assessment of Taliban
forces in Maywand suggested that
the Band‑e Timor strip north of
the Arghandab River concealed a
facilitation network plus a line of
arms dumps and an intelligence
node on the boundary with Zharey
district. An enemy IED cell was
known to operate in Ghorak district,
north of the Garmabak Pass, but had
sortied south previously and killed
both British and Canadian troops
passing through the district. The
presence of static enemy fighting
forces could not be confirmed. The
Taliban generally moved through
the area singly or in small groups,
but sometimes coalesced to shoot up
the Maywand district centre for info
ops effect. Enemy medium value
individuals (MVIs), or leadership
targets, were present from time to
time, most likely using the Band-e
Timor area as a rat line. Significant
movement of coalition forces into
the district would set these pieces in

“A” Company 1 RGR moves out from Objective CHELSEA. The terrain
in this photo is typical for the southern Maywand district.
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left – In the field the 1 RGR battalion tac
headquarters has the ability to link to
imagery provided by a variety of unmanned
aerial vehicles, including MQ-1 Predator
and MQ-9 Reaper.

– Influence operations include
the use of Key Leader Engagements. In
this case, a local shura in Band-e Timor
sits down with Lieutenant-Colonel Jonny
Bourne for a chat about local expectations
and conditions.

below left

motion, either to escape or to engage,
and then tactical responses by 1 RGR
battlegroup would be generated
accordingly. With a dispersed enemy
hiding amongst the population, this
was one of several ways to flush them
out.
Much of the staff effort dealt
with coordination and deconfliction
to avoid situations like the Tarnak
Farms tragedy in 2002 where four
Canadian soldiers were killed by
a bomb dropped by a US aircraft.
68
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For example, at least three types
of special operations forces, none
of them belonging to RC(South),
operated throughout the region.
They possessed their own ISTAR
resources and air support, and those
resources had to be coordinated with
ISTAR and air support assigned to
RC(South). To make matters more
complicated, some of these platforms
were the same, ie: they worked for
NATO ISAF as well as the other
entities. The priority was not always

NATO ISAF, depending what was
going on elsewhere in the country, so
availability had to be confirmed.
There were legal aspects that
men like Lieutenant-Colonel Marc
Gendron, the LEGAD (Legal Advisor)
at RC(South), had to sort out. What
rules of engagement were going to
be used - Canadian, British, NATO?
Under what conditions would they
change? Who would approve those
changes? What could be blown up
and what couldn’t?
At Task Force Kandahar, control
measures between the battle groups’
forces operating in neighbouring
Zharey district and the RBG(S) had
to be established. For example, the
templated range of a 120 mm gun
on a Leopard 2 A6M was in excess
of four kilometers. If the tanks were
firing at something to the west of
Zharey, could they accidentally hit
the manoeuvring units? Or, if the
Van Doos used artillery on a target in
Panjwayi, nobody wanted lumbering
CH-47’s flying through the rounds
as they arced through the airspace.
These are not mundane matters when
millions of dollars of helicopters and
several hundred priceless human
lives are at stake.
One of the main issues in planning
SOHIL LARAM II revolved around
the early warning problem. The
expansion of the cell phone network in
Kandahar province since 2003 meant
that any person with a cell phone
was a potential sensor. The Taliban
had non-insurgent insurgents (locals
paid to do a specific, one-time task),

8
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ideological sympathizers from the old
days or people coerced into providing
information. In effect, each district
had an insurgent reporting network
that was activated the moment
coalition forces arrived on the scene.
The network could communicate
in a variety of ways. This reporting
network extended from Maywand
to the gates of Kandahar Air Field
(and probably within the base itself).
Deception, therefore, was a critical
component in the plan.
When 1 RGR wargamed the
operation it became clear that the
presence of 100-plus vehicles on
Ring Road South during the day or
night would be more than enough to
activate the enemy warning system.
The enemy would not know exactly
where the force was going, however.
To get from the highway and into
Band-e Timor would take time – it is
over 12 kilometers with no roads. It
would be enough time for the enemy
to hide or disperse before the force
arrived.
The obvious answer was to
conduct an airmobile insertion at
night to achieve surprise. There
were two problems with this course
of action. The first was helicopter
availability and the second was the
perfidious weather situation. Night
airmobile operations are complicated.
Throw dust into the mix and the
risk level rose dramatically, as the
Americans found out during the
Desert One disaster in 1980.3 There
were only so many helicopters and
they were heavily tasked. 1 RGR
generated two courses of action – a
ground move and insertion, and a
combination ground move and
airmobile insertion.
The second course of action was
the best. The ground convoys would
move along Ring Road South, the
enemy would activate the early
warning system and watch the
vehicles. As the ground force moved
off the roads south towards Band-e
Timor, the enemy would be fixated
on its progress. Without warning the
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009

airmobile force would emerge out of
the desert from the south and surprise
them. The first course of action was
second best but the planners came
up with a scheme to use air power to
take out any enemy forces trying to
escape the area.
The elongated nature of Band‑e
Timor posed some challenges. There
were clusters of compound complexes
all along the river for some 15-20
kilometers. There were irrigation
systems, including a canal with
fast running water moving through
and between the complexes. Each
compound cluster was separated
by rolling but open arid terrain.
The planners decided that the two
companies would be inserted on
either end of the Band-e Timor river
zone and work towards the centre.
An Artillery Manoeuvre Area (AMA)
for the Canadian guns and the 1 RGR
logistics echelon would be established
on the Dasht in part to act as a block
but also to give the artillery reach to
the south.
On the way through Hutel, one
platoon would be dropped off and
start working with the new police,
while the battalion command post
would be set up in the district centre.
Part of one of the companies would
later be brought north to Hutel and
join in operations there when the
Afghan National Army arrived. If
enemy forces appeared in the north
near Ghorak, a contingency plan
was formulated to respond to that
move.

Execution: Insertion and
Pursuit

D

uring the afternoon of 20
February the weather situation
was not good as the infantry
companies rehearsed embarking
and disembarking their helicopter
chalks in an open field. A small
dust event was moving into the
Kandahar area and the hills that were
normally visible from the airfield
were obscured with dust. On the

evening of 20 February elements of
2nd Kandak moved to Camp Roberts,
the 1 RGR camp on Kandahar Air
Field, to link up with the Vikings
and Vectors. The weather cleared
enough by then and the airmobile
insertion was approved. The convoys
departed around midnight while
the two infantry companies awoke
from forced rest, prepared their
equipment, and were bused to the
helicopter hanger area.
At 0235 hours IFF (identification
of friend or foe) control measures
(glow sticks and min-beacons) were
activated and attached to helmets
and weapons checked. RAF ground
personnel mustered the chalks in
the dark as the crews of the CH-47
and Lynx helicopters prepared their
aircraft. The APUs whined as they
started the engines, and soon the loud
whop-whop-whop of the huge blades
smacked the air. The Gurkhas filed
in, and when everybody was loaded,
RAF Chinooks and Army Air Corps
Lynx taxied into a line and lifted off
the runway into a sharp banking
turn that took the force into the
Reg Desert. British Army Air Corps
AH‑64 Apache attack helicopters,
already in the air, joined up to escort
the force. Helicopters are loud by
nature so everything possible was
done to mask the noise signature
and achieve surprise. In this case,
the desert was empty and the enemy
early warning net does not extend
to the south out of the built-up areas
between Kandahar and Maywand.
The circuitous route also gave time
for the slower convoys moving along
Ring Road South to get into position.
Indeed, enemy “eyes” were focused
on the Vikings and Vectors as they
drove towards Helmand.
With the doors open and gunners
with night vision leaning out checking
the ground, the temperature inside
the Chinooks was near freezing for
the 40 minutes it took to fly from
KAF to a point south of Maywand
district. The full moon bathed the
desert sand so it looked like an ocean
69
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as the helicopters surfed the ground
effect at low level. At this point the
force split into two and headed for
their respective company helicopter
landing sites (HLS). The loadies held
up two fingers – two minutes to the
HLS – and the Gurkhas tapped each
man ahead of them with two fingers.
Everybody stood up and seconds
later the machines’ noses lurched up
to flare into the HLS. “A” Company
had a rough time – its Chinooks hit
the ground hard, probably because
of the moon-dust-like powder that
obscured the distance to the ground.
There were several injuries including
broken noses and twisted knees.
The Gurkhas poured out into a
defensive posture as the Chinooks
and Lynxs lifted off, showering the
soldiers with large rocks and dust
for several seconds. Once the birds
were gone the company commanders
70
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/8

checked the surrounding area with
night vision and when satisfied,
started to move off in the dark
towards the objective compound
complexes. There was no contact at
first.
“A” Company got into complex
CHELSEA without incident and
initiated several searches. “C”
Company, on the other hand,
immediately bumped into the Taliban
after insertion near NEWCASTLE
and BATH. 7 Platoon and 9 Platoon
disembarked on the HLSs, with 7
Platoon to the north. A group of
enemy in a compound complex south
of 9 Platoon’s HLS were spotted by
an orbiting MQ-1 Predator. 7 Platoon
swung into a blocking position to
the west of the complex as 9 Platoon
moved in, but the enemy pulled
out to the south to another group of
compounds. 7 Platoon moved south

in parallel and there were some shots
fired. The company commander
moved 9 Platoon in a leapfrog to the
complex to the south of where the
enemy was, but while this was in
progress, the Taliban continued to
move south. At this point, they could
not be engaged from the air because
of an ROE (rules of engagement)
issue, so the pursuit continued.
The Taliban force, numbering
some 17 personnel, crossed the river.
7 Platoon engaged with 7.62 mm
machine gun fire when the Taliban
silhouetted themselves on the skyline
and then the enemy split up. One
group of six struck southwest into the
desert, while the remainder dodged
9 Platoon and swung north, trying to
cross the river and flank them. At this
point, they were engaged by a B-1B
using three GBU-38 500-lb bombs.
The strike, conducted around 0810
10
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right – Close air support was used during
Op SOHIL LARAM II including a successful
strike by a US Air Force B-1B on a Taliban
group attempting to exfiltrate the
engagement area.
centre right – The Viking oversnow vehicle
was adapted for use in Afghanistan.
Crewed by Royal Marines, this Viking troop
acted as a mobile screen during cordon
and search operations around Band-e
Timor.
bottom right – Moving along Highway 1 from

the DERBY box to Hutel, the battalion tac
Vector vehicles halt so the Gurkhas can
conduct a defile drill to deter IED attack.

hours, was estimated to have killed
four and wounded three Taliban.
The survivors turned east, heading
towards Zharey. 7 Platoon moved
east, south of the river, and 9 Platoon
moved east, while the Fire Support
group manoeuvred into several
blocking positions to the north. In
time the pursuit turned up nothing
as the enemy hid their weapons
and melted away in the compound
complexes near BATH.
The effects of the dance between
“C” Company and the Taliban in
Objectives NEWCASTLE and BATH
was immediate. ISTAR resources
reported that there was an enemy
leadership target in the area. The
combination of the Predator and
the B-1B were kept on station as
long as possible in case more enemy
presented themselves.
Meanwhile, “A” Company’s
searches continued in CHELSEA. The
NDS team working with the company
discovered suspect materials of what
might be IED production materials of
a new type, but it turned out not to
be the case. Of more interest was the
discovery of a modified white Toyota
Corolla, a type commonly associated
with SVBIED’s (suicide vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device) in RC
(South). Numerous papers, ID cards,
and notebooks were uncovered and
sent off for translation. Then ISTAR
resources reported that another
enemy medium value target was
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009

71

11

Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 8
located in a compound complex
adjacent to CHELSEA. That made
two significant enemy leaders present
in Band-e Timor. “A” Company then
detained an individual who was part
of the Taliban early warning network.
It was 0845 hours on the first day.

Execution: Influence
Operations

A

n important aspect of operations
like SOHIL LARAM II is how
the manoeuvre force relates to the
population. The intended effects
of this relationship were built into
the plan. Indeed, the deployment
of the battalion CO and his tactical
headquarters early in the operation in
part related to influence operations.
These operations essentially
combined information operations and
CIMIC assessments with on-the-spot
assessments of the religious/political,
tribal and community dynamics

while the operation was in progress
with the aim of positively influencing
the population. Fundamentally, there
are local dynamics that cannot be
captured by the broader examination
of tribal dynamics or provincial
political processes in southern
Afghanistan. The only way to do so
is through immediate close contact
with the population.
The primary tool in the case
of SOHIL LARAM II was the Key
Leader Engagement (KLE) where 1
RGR sought out local leaders and
met with them in shuras with other
local elders and power brokers. Using
interpreters and the accompanying
NDS personnel, the meetings
yielded valuable information on the
attitudes of the community as well
as their needs, in addition to tactical
information on enemy activities. The
meetings also permitted PSYOPS to
disseminate their messages in subtle
ways and explain to the local leaders

and people what the coalition forces
were doing in the area and why. In
theory, follow-on CIMIC activities
and then development assistance
from the Provincial Reconstruction
Team would follow but in the case of
a foray like SOHIL LARAM II, only
assessments within the constraints of
the tactical situation could be made.
Development could only take place
with the long term domination of
the area by Afghan national security
forces
1 RGR conducted numerous
KLEs and shuras in the Band-e
Timor communities during the
course of SOHIL LARAM II. The
presence of the 1 RGR CO and his
tactical headquarters on the ground
with “A” Company was useful.
Having an older head man from the
coalition meeting with the local elders
facilitated dialogue in ways that were
not as effective with younger men
meeting with older men in certain

A pair of M-777 155 mm guns from “B”
Battery, 2 Royal Canadian Horse artillery
firing from the DERBY box in support of
“A” Company, 1st Battalion, The Royal
Gurkha Rifles.
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circumstances. Respect goes a long
way and it is generation-based in the
Pashtun culture.
The picture that emerged after
several KLEs, though generalized,
was at odds with the perception
that the communities were proTaliban and had been for several
years. The message transmitted to
the coalition forces was that the
bulk of the population would in fact
welcome an Afghan National Army
presence, even ANA strong points.
They were generally not supportive
of the Taliban, but they had no
choice because there was little or no
government presence. They did not,
however, want an Afghan National
Police presence. The population had
extremely poor relations with the
ANP in Hutel, and even referred to
them as “bastards.” They informed
coalition personnel that they had
problems getting produce to the
markets in Hutel. Whether this
was the result of actions by corrupt
police, insurgents dressed as police,
or a combination was difficult to
determine, but practically all elders
called for the removal of the current
district leader. The people were
interested in improved health care
and an education system, but the
attitude of “we’ll believe it when we
see it” prevailed. Indeed, the CIMIC
teams learned that, surprisingly,
many landowners lived in Kabul and
rarely visited Band-e Timor.
Note that KLE’s were not always
a matter of just sitting down and
drinking tea. On one occasion
personnel accompanying the CO
were menaced by a disheveled,
crazed young man wielding a pick.
He was tied to a tree by two elders

to prevent him from interfering with
the shura.
The insertion and manoeuvre of
the 1 RGR battlegroup had a number
of other effects on the enemy forces
throughout Band-e Timor-Hutel
triangle. ISTAR resources detected
enemy activity consistent with a plan
to screen the escape of leaders, some
of whom appeared to be in Objective
YORK. One enemy group or observer
had “eyes on” the Canadian 155 mm
gun position and Gurkha echelon
located at DERBY. The CO was
concerned that the enemy, though
psychologically off balance, would
stay put and wait out the operation, so
he pressed for more manoeuvre with
the intent to get the enemy moving,
get him to make mistakes and make
him vulnerable to strikes or capture.
The low level of civilian pattern of
life was surprising and was a possible
indicator that the population was
not interested in providing cover for
enemy movement out of fear of being
targeted by coalition forces.
As the day progressed,
more attention was paid to the
compounds in Objective YORK by
ISTAR resources. It was increasingly
apparent that one or more enemy

leaders were located somewhere in
there. At least one was ordered by
his high command in Pakistan to
leave and avoid being captured at
all costs. Other enemy groups in Op
Boxes BURMA and MALAYA were
ordered by their higher headquarters
to escape while they could. “A”
Company was ordered to prepare
for a future tasking in that area. As
ISTAR assets scoured the district, the
155 mm guns were readied and more
air power was requested, just in case
anything moved. The ISTAR priority
remained Objective YORK.
The enemy knew there were
coalition forces in CHELSEA and
he could see that the cordon and
searches had been extended from the
compounds in CHELSEA to those in
LEICESTERSHIRE. To the enemy,
it looked like “A” Company was
plodding its way east through the
various complexes. The 1 RGR plan
was to finish with LEICESTERSHIRE
and then “tab” (route march) to
DONCASTER, make it look like the
force was bedding down to deceive
observers, and then conduct a rapid
night approach march along the
Arghandab river and arrive at YORK
at first light to search the compounds.

A joint Afghan National Army-Maywand
District police patrol prepares to deploy
into Hutel from the district centre.
These patrols are crucial in establishing
government presence in this volatile
district.
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The Viking squadron would depart
DORCHESTER just before first light
to establish a screen north of YORK
to catch any “leakers.”
Meanwhile, the Fire Support
Group snipers screening to the north
of “C” Company were observing
people moving about Objective
DOVER but were unable to determine
whether they were enemy forces.
When “C” Company got into the
compounds, they determined that
the leadership target that had been
there had slipped away, possibly
headed north to Hutel. The presence
of two Harrier GR-7 close support
aircraft flying up and down the river
appeared to have deterred any enemy
movement south.
While “A” Company was laying
up in DONCASTER and preparing
for the night tab, ISTAR resources
identified one of the leadership
targets as a logistics facilitator but he
was located west of DONCASTER,
about a kilometer away. This target
appeared to be different from the
one(s) in YORK. Should the plan be
altered to take him out or not? The
decision was made to search for him
but to carry on with YORK. Attempts
were made to get an American
Pathfinder Platoon from TF EAGLE
ASSAULT and insert them to get him,
or if that were not possible, bring
in a section of US Army OH-58D
Warrior recce helicopters, but the
forces were not available. To the east,
“C” Company reported the seizure of
a small number of weapons in their
areas. The locals claimed the Taliban
“left yesterday.” This was most likely
the group engaged by the B-1B. More
importantly, “C” Company reported
that the locals were hostile to coalition
forces the closer they were to Zharey
district. Thus far, it looked like there
were at least three leadership targets
on the loose south of Hutel.
“A” Company’s night tab and
early morning entry in YORK was
anti-climactic. A major KLE was
held, however, late in the morning
at YORK. The elders here told the
74
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coalition forces they welcomed a
ANA but not an ANP presence, that
the enemy moved through the area
but the locals would not let them
stay in the area out of fear of coalition
air strikes. It appeared as though
the Taliban acquiesced to the locals
without a lot of intimidation because
this was the only route to resupply its
forces in Zharey district and they did
not want a hostile population on such
vital ground. Interestingly, the local
leaders explained that Taliban forces
moving through their complexes
spoke Punjabi, not Pashtun, and that
this was a common occurrence.
There were no contacts and
ISTAR resources detected no
leadership target movement in that
objective area, though it looked like
the DONCASTER contact wanted to
make his way to Helmand province
to the west. “A” Company was
ordered back to LEICESTERSHIRE
with the Viking screen to try and hunt
the DONCASTER contact.
ISTAR then reported that another
leadership target that had been in
YORK was on the move and was
no longer in YORK. How he got
out was a mystery, but clumps of
newly-shaven hair were discovered
near a compound he may have
been hiding in, so he may have
altered his appearance and departed.
ISTAR resources reported yet another
medium-value leader who evacuated
Op Box BURMA as the Gurkhas
moved towards it. Unfortunately,
the resources needed to identify and
engage him were not available.

Execution: Consolidation

C

oncurrent activity in Hutel and
the surrounding area on the
second day of the operation produced
immediate results. The Gurkha
platoon and Canadian CIMIC and
PSYOPS initiated a series of joint
patrols with the newly-arrived ANP
and awaited engineering resources
to start the reconstruction of the
ANP checkpoints on Highway 4.

The joint patrols discovered that
there were hard feelings towards
coalition forces dating back to at least
2002 when the poppy eradication
programme was initiated by the
Afghan Interim Administration.
At some point around 20 farmers
were killed during demonstrations.
The patrols immediately explained
that the coalition and the Afghan
security forces were not in Maywand
to eradicate poppy, that they were
there to improve security and hunt
Taliban. This impromptu information
operation countered the prevailing
Taliban information ops message
that the coalition presence would disenfranchise and starve the farmers
and their families.
Hutel bazaar was a thriving
collection of establishments, despite
Taliban attempts to intimidate the
populace. The latest attempt was
six weeks prior when 16 policemen
were executed after their checkpoint
was seized west of the town. ISTAR
resources discovered that there were
in fact enemy present in the western
part of Hutel and they had 1 RGR
under observation. An enemy cell
planned to place an IED on Highway
1 but the plan was thwarted by the
presence of the joint patrols.
The joint patrols also turned up
some significant finds on day three.
Two white Toyota Corollas were
discovered in a wadi concealed with
a tarp. They were full of fuel and in
good running order. There were no
weapons found, but it was likely that
these vehicles were pre-positioned so
they could be quickly modified for
SVBIED use or as getaway cars for
enemy leadership. Indeed, ISTAR
reported that there were enemy
nearby but details remained vague.
The vehicles were confiscated and
none of the locals complained.
“C” Company continued with its
operations to the south east. A sniper
lay back observation post spotted two
pick up trucks behaving suspiciously
in the evening near the locations of
the B-1B strikes. They appeared to be
14
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Two of the ubiquitous white Toyota Corollas were seized by one of the joint patrols
before they could be converted for use as suicide improvised explosive devices.

cleaning up the remains of the strike
or looking for wounded, The vehicles
disappeared into the desert before
they could be engaged by a pair of
F-16’s that were on station.
“C” Company remained
interested in the area, as there were
indications from KLE’s that the
locals were annoyed with coalition
operations, probably special
operations forces operations, that
bothered them at night. The NDS
detachment confirmed from the
locals that leadership targets had
been moving through the area, that
it was a waypoint for personnel,
not weapons storage. They also
developed a theory that the Taliban
groups that took off during the first
night were a protection party for a
significant Taliban leader and their
starburst actions were designed to
distract the coalition forces from
locating and engaging the enemy
leader.
Other information developed by
the NDS and various ISTAR resources
confirmed that there were still
leadership targets in the area between
the river and Hutel and learned that
there was a safe house that catered
to Taliban commanders somewhere
near Objectives SINGAPORE and
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009

CANTERBURY. As there was a lack
of “fidelity” on the target, 1 RGR
battlegroup remained focused on
securing the district centre in Hutel
and working on the checkpoints
before expanding the joint patrols
outwards prematurely.
Then the enemy detonated
an IED amidst an ANP convoy,
wounding four. Incredibly, the ANP
apprehended two insurgents who
had other devices or components
on them. They were brought to the
district centre for interrogation by
the ANP. Not to be outdone, “A”
Company searches to the southwest
uncovered IED components in a
village west of DERBY. Two more
prisoners were taken, both were
in possession of cell phones and
coughed up useful information on
enemy movements in the district
and the types of vehicles they were
employing.
At this point, the shift of
emphasis was confirmed by the CO.
“C” Company would focus solely
on influence operations with the
ANP in and around Hutel awaiting
the arrival of the ANA, while
“A” Company would search and
exploit any information it collected

along BURMA, MALAYA and
SINGAPORE.
The plan for SOHIL LARAM
II took into account the possibility
that Afghan National Army forces
might participate but the 2nd ANA
Kandak in Zharey district was itself
preparing to rotate out and it was not
clear what forces would be available
or for how long. Lieutenant-Colonel
Shareen Shah, the CO of 2nd Kandak,
determined that two companies
would deploy from Howz-e Madad
in Zharey to Hutel for two days. The
idea was to conduct as many joint
ANA-ANP patrols as possible in the
area to demonstrate to the population
that the ANA and new Maywand
ANP were going to cooperate
effectively from now on, cement
the linkages procedurally between
the two forces and get them used to
working together.
On day four, around 0830
hours, a seeming endless stream of
ANA vehicles started to arrive in
Hutel – Ford Ranger pick up trucks,
International 2.5-ton trucks, and even
several mottled Hummers equipped
with 12.7 mm machine guns. At the
end of the column, several Canadian
RG-31 vehicles discreetly entered the
district headquarters compound. This
75
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left – Gurkha medics, under the direction
of Dr. D.F. Reid, and members of the
Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison
Team work to save the lives of wounded
Afghan soldiers.
above – A US Army UH-60 prepares to lift
off with some of the Afghan National Army
casulaties.

was the 12-man Operational Mentor
and Liaison Team (OMLT) led by
Major Corey Frederickson from 3rd
Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry, who mentored
elements of 2nd Kandak. The stream
of vehicles continued for some time
and the entire population turned out
to watch. These ANA soldiers, unlike
their predecessors from two years
ago, wore helmets, body armour,
chest rigs and carried themselves
with some professionalism. The
ANP were visibly envious. The
PSYOPS team working the crowds
detected a feeling that approximated
to “the cavalry has arrived.” It was
evident from conversations with the
76
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people that they were surprised and
even proud that the ANA was in
Hutel. This psychological effect was
identified and exploited as soon as
possible. Lieutenant-Colonel Shah
immediately linked up with the Hutel
ANP and launched a series of foot
and vehicle patrols throughout the
area with the police and with “C”
Company.
While the Afghan national security
force (ANSF) saturation of Hutel
and environs was underway, “A”
Company continued its movements
to the south west near DERBY and
around LEICESTERSHIRE and
CHELSEA. Using the Viking squadron
as a screen, “A” Company collected

significant low-level intelligence
related to Taliban activities in the
area. Then the Royal Marines bagged
a “leaker” from one of the searches,
who was identified as Taliban. This
individual gave up a relative and
the NDS identified both as local
Taliban leaders. They were passed
on to Hutel for exploitation with
the hope they would give up more
elements of the facilitation network.
The NDS exploited several document
and laptop finds and found lists
of enemy personnel, and a list of
judges that had been paid off by
the Taliban to release captured
insurgents. Other documentation
detailed links to support areas in
Pakistan. There was so much material
it had to be transported elsewhere for
exploitation. The hunt continued.
Canadian CIMIC and PSYOPS
teams accompanied the joint GurkhaANSF patrols throughout Hutel. The
picture they developed, confirmed by
ISTAR, was at odds with previous
assessments. Only the northwest
quadrant of Hutel was seriously
pro-Taliban. For the most part, 75
percent or more of the population
was supportive of the government.
As before, they were intimidated by
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the previous Maywand police forces
and tended to sit on the fence. Indeed,
the local clinic sold medical supplies
to the Taliban to keep them away.
7 Platoon deployed west along
Highway 1 with engineers and
ANP and continued to refurbish the
checkpoint system. The Gurkhas
conducted a series of clearance patrols
and vehicle checkpoints to clear each
site to facilitate construction. ISTAR
reportage also identified possible
enemy leaders in a compound
complex south of the district centre,
so Lieutenant-Colonel Shah deployed
two of his platoons, accompanied by
Gurkhas and Canadians, to conduct
searches.
ISTAR reportage continued
throughout the evening. First there
was a threat warning of possible IED
placement west of the district centre
on the highway. This IED attack was
to be accompanied by an ambush.
ANSF foot patrols flooded into the
areas and successfully deterred this
attack. The device was found and
blown up, which really annoyed
the local Taliban cell leader. Further
reportage indicated that an enemy
medium value leadership target was
present somewhere in the compounds
east of the district centre.
While night was falling “C”
Company developed an outline
plan to go after him. The problem
was the complexity of this particular
built-up area, which amounted to a
rabbit warren of compounds, alleys,
walled cultivated areas and streams.
It would be difficult to seal off the
area, this would require the whole
battalion, but the close proximity to
the district centre weighed in favour
of an audacious move. A platoon
from “C” Company went in trying to

get as close as possible to the enemy
leader. A chase ensued, doors were
kicked in, and some rounds fired.
Unfortunately, the target escaped.
The next morning, a Gurkha
patrol with Canadian CIMIC and
PSYOPS personnel went back into
this community to conduct effects
mitigation. The patrol offered
compensation to house owners
who had property damaged during
the pursuit. Interestingly, nearly
every citizen had doors kicked in
and all demanded compensation.
Despite some hard feelings, the patrol
assessed that this community was
still pro-government and were not
knowingly hiding the enemy leader.
It appeared that a non-governmental
organization that had an office in
this community was assisting this
individual move around and hide.
The day 2nd Kandak was
scheduled to re-deploy back to Zharey
was wrought with tragedy. An ANA
soldier had a negligent discharge
with an RPG launcher inside a
concrete room which essentially
shredded the lower extremities of
eight Afghan soldiers. Gurkha medics
led by Dr. D.F Reid rushed to the site
while the Canadian OMLT soldiers
worked to stabilize the wounded. A

US Army UH-60 and a USAF HH-60
flew in to evacuate the wounded.
Unfortunately, seven of the eight
stricken Afghans eventually died
of their wounds. ISTAR determined
that the enemy had “eyes on” the
whole process and steps were taken
to deter their planned actions against
the MEDEVAC helicopters.
The Taliban immediately
exploited this event for information
operations purposes and spread the
word throughout Hutel that they
had attacked the ANA and caused
the casualties. The situation was
complicated by the fact that 2nd
Kandak was leaving. This could
become an information ops victory for
the Taliban if they could portray the
scheduled withdrawal as a response
to the casualties they suppposedly
inflicted and thus reduce the positive
effects generated by the joint ANSF
patrolling. The Canadian PSYOPS
and CIMIC operators deployed with
Gurkha and ANP patrols to counter
the enemy message during the course
of the next day. Surprisingly, the
teams learned that local people,
some of them four kilometres from
Hutel, already knew that the blast
was an accident and was not Taliban
action.

During a night raid in Hutel, private
property was damaged. A Canadian
PSYOPS/CIMIC team accompanied by a
Gurkha patrol conducts compensation
activities with the local population.
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One of the other enemy medium
value leadership targets was moving
between NEWCASTLE and a position
south of the district centre. There was
some concern that he might collect
fighters and, emboldened by the
RPG tragedy, mount a night attack
against the district centre to profit
from the situation and enhance
the Taliban’s stature with both the
Taliban-supportive population and
to intimidate the pro-government
population. The attack failed to
materialize for unknown reasons.
Other cells to the west of the district
centre, thwarted in their activities
and frustrated, were trying to bring
RPGs and another IED into the area to
ambush coalition vehicles traveling
down Highway 1. Foot patrols sent
into the area coupled with the low
level pass of a pair of Mirage 2000
fighters deterred this activity.
ISTAR reportage indicated that
one of the enemy leaders had made
his way to Helmand province, while
another was trying to get out of the
area south east of the district centre.
Op SOHIL LARAM II was winding
down and the resources to conduct
a detailed search for this individual
were not available, but it was clear
that the raid to the east of the district
centre looking for the third leader
unsettled the enemy that remained
in the Hutel area. In effect, they
ordered their people to go to ground,
stop communicating, and cease
operations.

Resolution

A

fter seven days of operations in
Maywand district, Task Force
TIGER re-deployed to Kandahar
Air Field and made its preparations
to depart Afghanistan and return
to its home station in Brunei. The
Canadian CIMIC and PSYOPS teams
were sent back to Maywand almost
immediatley once RC (South) and
TF Kandahar assessed the situation
and realized that an opportunity
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presented itself. Sufficient forces
were not available for a complete
occupation of the district, but creative
ways to maintain the momentum
generated by Op SOHIL LARAM II
were explored and implemented in
March 2008.
As with any operation in
Afghanistan, determining specific
long or short term effects is no easy
task. One of the most important was
the relative lack of enemy action
directed at the relief in place of the
Canadian battlegroup in Zharey
and Panjwayi districts, short of
some IED activity. When the enemy
did attempt to engage Canadian
forces in western Zharey/Panjwayi
he lacked the ammunition to do
so effecively and even complained
about that fact. Similarly, there was
almost no ambush or IED activity
directed against forces travelling
along Highway 1 between Helmand
and Kandahar for some weeks. Again
determining exactly why this was the
case is open to some interpretation,
but a tentative conclusion can be
made with some confidence.
Substantial information on the
Taliban’s structure in Maywand
district was collected during the
course of the operation. There was also
increased confidence demonstrated
by the Afghan police and army
outwards towards the population
and internally between the two
organizations. Taken together, this
provided any follow on force or
security measures a solid base for
future action. Demonstrating to
the enemy that Maywand was no
longer a safe haven or a seam though
ambiguous on the surface, has the
potential to contribute positively
towards a pro-government orientation
later on as well.
Finally Operation SOHIL LARAM
II forced several enemy commanders
to scatter from what they viewed as
a comfortable no-go zone. This in
turn made them vulnerable to other
coalition action and at the same time

disrupted whatever plans they were
working on at the time.
Operation SOHIL LARAM II
confirmed that the posession of an
operational manoeuvre capacity by
Regional Command (South), when
wielded properly, could generate
positive operational as well as tactical
effects in the complex environment of
southern Afghanistan in the face of an
insurgent enemy. To commemorate
the new link forged between the
Canadian army and the Gurkhas,
1 RGR was awarded the Canadian
Forces Unit Commendation in May
2008:
For outstandign elan and exemplary
combat skills that directly contributed
to the overall success of Task
Force Kandahar during Operation
ATHENA, Afghanistan, Sep 07 to
Mar 08.

Notes
A Note on Sources – The author observed
the operational planning process for SOHIL
LARAM II at Regional Command (South),
Task Force Kandahar, and 1 RGR battlegroup
and then accompanied the Gurkha battalion
into the field for the duration of the operation.
Certain control measures have been altered
and intelligence sources blurred for operational
security considerations.
1.

2.
3.

The Helmand-deployed 1 RGR company
occupied a forward operating base near
Garmsir. Not coincidentally, the Joint
Terminal Air Controller assigned to that
company was a certain “Captain Harry
Wales,” better known as Prince Harry.
The TLAV is a dramatically re-engineered
M-113A3 APC.
This was the failed US operation to rescue
the American hostages held in Iran in
April 1980. The mission was aborted with
the loss of eight US lives, seven RH-53D
helicopters and a C-130 transport aircraft.
One of the main contributing factors
to the disaster was an unexpected dust
storm in the Iranian desert.

Dr. Sean M. Maloney is the historical advisor
to the Chief of the Land Staff. He has
travelled annually to Afghanistan since 2003
to observe coalition operations. He is the
author of several books including Enduring
the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan
and the forthcoming, Confronting the Chaos:
A Rogue Historian Returns to Afghanistan.
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